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THE OFFENCE OF INSULT IN THE POLISH PENAL CODE 
(ARTICLE 216) 
Article 216 of the Polish Penal Code (PC) sets out criminal liability for a 
criminal insult of another natural person. However, all entities other than 
natural persons (e.g. institutions and legal persons) remain outside the scope of 
Article 216 PC. However, the phrase "another person" used by the legislature 
does not exclude considering a group of persons whose personal dignity the 
offender has abused by his/her conduct as the object of the causative action [1]. 
Article 216 § 1 PC defines the basic type of the crime the substance of which is 
expressed in insulting another person in his/her presence or even in his/her 
absence but publicly, or with the intention that the insult reaches that person 
(punishable by a restriction of liberty or a fine). On the other hand, Article 216 
§ 2 PC defines an aggravated type, consisting in insulting another person via 
means of mass communication (punishable by a fine, deprivation of liberty or 
imprisonment of up to one year). The insult was criminalised also under 
previous Polish criminal legislation (Article 256 PC of 1932, Article 181 PC of 
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1969), but only the basic type of crime was known until the entry into force of 
the Penal Code of 1997. All Polish penal codes regulated also the institutions of 
the so-called provocation and retort (Article 256 §2 of the PC of 1932, 
Article 181 §2 of the PC of 1969, Article 216 §3 of the PC of 1997). 
The object of protection here is dignity (in Polish: cześć). Colloquially, the 
Polish word cześć is defined as respect, honour, appreciation, but it also has a 
different meaning, equivalent to worship, admiration (and in the latter sense is 
usually not subject to criminal law protection). There is duality within the 
meaning of the term "dignity": in the external (objective) and internal 
(subjective) sense [2]. When we speak of external dignity, we mean the value 
that a person has in the eyes of other people (the social significance of an 
individual), while in the case of inner dignity we mean the sense of personal 
dignity of a person (the inner value of a person). For the provisions of 
Article 216 PC, the object of protection is the internal (personal) dignity [3], 
and in the case of defamation (Article 212k.k.) – theexternal (objective) dignity. 
The dignity of every natural person is protected, regardless of their sex, 
age, social status or origin [4]. Even mentally ill or impaired people are not 
deprived of the value that is inextricably linked to being human, and they can 
therefore be insulted [5]. In the event of a public insult to a group of people or 
an individual for reasons of their nationality, ethnicity, race, religion or lack of 
religious affiliation, the provision of Article 257 PC applies. The element of 
insult also appears in a number of other types of crime: Article 133 PC (insult 
to the Polish Nation or the Republic of Poland), Article 135 § 2 PC (insult to 
the President of the Republic of Poland), Article 136 § 3 PC (insult to the head 
of a foreign state), Article 136 § 4 PC(insult to a diplomatic personnel member 
or a consular official), Article 137 PC (insult to Polish national symbols), 
Article 196 PC (insult to an object of religious worship or a place intended for 
the public performance of religious rites), Article 226 PC (insult to a public 
official or a person assisting this official), Article 261 PC (insult to a 
monument), Article 262 § 1 PC, (insult to human corpses, human ashes or the 
resting place of the deceased), Article 347 PC (insult to one’s superior), 
Article 350 PC (insult to one’s subordinate) [6]. 
The provision of Article 216 § 1 PC clearly defines three "subtypes" of 
insult: 
1) in the presence of the insulted person (the so-called direct insult); 
2) in the absence of the insulted person, but committed publicly; 
3) non-publicly and in the absence of the insulted person, but with the 
intention that the insult reach that person. 
Items 2 and 3 refer to what is known as an insult in absentia. As argued by 
the Court of Appeal in Warsaw in its judgment of 26 February 2018, (VI ACa 
1576/16, LEX No 2578915): "An insult consists of statements which are 
offensive to the dignity of a given person, insulting or ridiculing, which cannot 
be rationalized. Since an insult is an injury to a person’s self-esteem, an insult - 
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unlike a defamation - may also occur if the recipient of an offensive statement 
is solely that person". 
The legislature has not specified what insult what to be consisting in, but 
the broad understanding of the term is usually adopted [7]. Therefore, an insult 
should be understood as any behaviour of the perpetrator which demonstrably 
expresses contempt for another person, and in particular is intended to humiliate 
his or her personal dignity and make them feel hurt or offended (decision of the 
Supreme Court of 7.5.2008, III KK 234/07, OSNKW 2008/9/69). The 
prevailing view among scholars in the field is that an insult can only be 
committed by action. Nonetheless, it is argued that, exceptionally, it can also be 
committed by omission [8], for example by not shaking hands to welcome a 
person suspected of having committed a crime (which, however, must raise 
serious doubts, due to the fact that the insult offender must have the obligation 
to act, and the source of such an obligation in the case of shaking hands cannot 
be specified). An insult may be committed orally, in writing, in print, image 
(e.g. caricature), or even by gesture [9]. An insult may be committed by 
violating the physical integrity of another person (slapping, tossing an object in 
someone’s face), which entails the need to apply the so-called cumulative 
qualification - Article 216 § 1 in concurrence with Article 217 § 1 in 
conjunction with Article 11 § 2 of the Penal Code [10]. 
This raises doubts as to what criteria should be used to assess whether an 
insult has occurred: subjective (i.e. taking into account only the assessment of 
one’s own value and feelings by a given person), objective (which takes into 
account the average level of assessment and respect for a person), or mixed 
(subjective-and-objective). The Supreme Court, in the resolution of 05.06.2012. 
(SNO 26/12, LEX no. 1231618), stated that "Whether a behaviour was insulting 
is determined by the prevailing social assessments and moral norms, and not by 
the subjective conviction of the allegedly insulted person". The use of the 
objective criterion, however, requires the establishment of a touchstone to 
which the behaviour assessed as insulting would be related; such touchstone 
may be the value system functioning in society. As rightly noted by 
R.A. Stefański, "The assessment of a certain behaviour as insulting based on 
this criterion does not take into account the fact that it depends on the cultural 
standards of society, environmental conditions, worldview conditions, or the 
group in which the perpetrator or victim live. For this reason, it is also 
necessary to take into account the social background assessments in so far as 
they contain norms that treat behaviour as insulting, even though they are 
relevant to the general public [11]. However, it should be noted that the 
assessment of behaviour as insulting cannot disregard the feelings of the 
insulted person, as it is first and foremost about infringing the person’s interest, 
which should therefore lead to the conclusion that most appropriate is the mixed 
(subjective-and-objective) criterion. 
The aggravated form of defamation (due to using the mass media by the 
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perpetrator) is defined in Article 212 § 2 PC. All generally available means, 
with which the transmission of information currently takes place, are possible 
(e.g. press, radio, television, Internet). As argued by the Constitutional Tribunal 
in the judgment of 30.10.2006, (P 10/06, OTK-A 2006/0, item 128) the mass 
media should be "centres that cumulatively meet the following criteria: need for 
the existence of a mass audience, topicality, concise character of information, 
public access to information and information quickly getting out-of-date 
(condition of contents about mass character), transmission of information in the 
certain package, institutionalisation of broadcaster and existence of the so-
called gate-keeper (controller of the content being broadcast, e.g. editor-in-
chief), thus exemplifying, inter alia, press in the strict sense, radio and 
television". On the other hand, the Supreme Court noted in the judgement of 
07.11.2014 (V KK 231/14, LEX no. 1583243) that «the term ‘means of mass 
communication’ is not about the mass availability of the medium itself, but 
about the mass availability of information broadcast by it» [12]. 
The offence in question is of a general nature. On the other hand, scholars 
in the field differ in views on the subjective elements of insult. The prevailing 
view is that both forms of intent: direct intent (dolus directus) and legal intent 
(dolus eventualis) are involved [13]. According to A. Marek, insulting is 
essentially an intentional behavior [14]. The view that insulting is a formal 
offence (offence not characterised by its effect) seems to prevail [15]. It is noted 
that no specific effect is necessary for its accomplishment, in particular that the 
addressee of an insulting statement does not need to feel offended or a written 
insult does need to reach the addressee to make the offence happen [16]. The 
material nature of the crime is supported by, among others, O. Górniok [17] and 
J. Wojciechowski [18]. 
Only a living person can be insulted; abusive speaking of a deceased person 
may, however, be intended to offend the personal dignity of a living person 
[19]. Insulting a human corpse, human ashes or the resting place of a deceased 
constitutes an offence under Article 262 § 1 PC. If the perpetrator offends 
several persons in a single statement, then it should be considered that he/she 
commits one act. The same happens where the perpetrator, at the same place 
and time, speaks various words of an insulting nature towards the same person, 
or at the same time uses offensive words and gestures to degrade the dignity of 
the person; there is also one action [20]. 
The prosecution of an insult of both the basic type (Article 216 § 1) and the 
agravated type (Article 216 § 2 – where the insult took place by means of mass 
media) is carried out under private prosecution. Pursuant to Article 60 § 1 of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure, in cases prosecuted by private prosecution, the 
public prosecutor shall initiate the proceedings or joins the proceedings already 
initiated if the public interest so requires. The proceedings are then conducted 
ex officio and the victim, who has previously brought a private indictment, 
exercises the rights of the auxiliary prosecutor; Articles 54, 55 § 3 and 58 of the 
 249 
Code of Criminal Procedure shall apply (Article 60 § 2 CCP). If the prosecutor 
who had joined the proceedings subsequently abandoned the prosecution, the 
victim returns in further proceedings to the rights of the private prosecutor 
(Article 60 § 3 CCP). 
Article 216 § 3 PC provides for the institution of so-called provocation and 
retort. Under the Penal Code, provocation occurs in two meanings: as inducing 
another person to commit a criminal offence in order to bring criminal 
proceedings against that person (Article 24 PC) and as a provocative behaviour 
of the victim (Article 216 § 3, Article 217 § 2). Literature distinguishes 
conscious and unconscious provocation, intentional and objective provocation, 
criminal and non-criminal provocation, one-sided and mutual provocation [21]. 
Under Article 216 PC, provocation is a provocative conduct of the victim, while 
retort takes place when the victim has responded to the insult by breaching 
bodily integrity or mutual insult. In the event of provocation or retort, the court 
may (but does not have to) refrain from imposing a penalty. There must be 
reasonable commensurability between provocation and reaction of the provoked 
person (cf. judgment of the Supreme Court of 17.06.1971, Rw 612/71, OSNKW 
1971/10, item 159). Writing about the nature of retort, J. Makarewicz stated: 
«The act of private revenge has replaced the state intervention. The retort […] 
merely extinguishes the state’s right of punishment as a result of self-
administering justice by the victim himself/herself. The state’s right of 
punishment, generated upon the insult, disappeared again when the offended 
replied with an insult. This is the point of gravity of the retort» [22]. 
The crime in its basic type (Article 216 § 1) is punishable by a fine (from 
10 to 540 day-fine units) or a penalty of restriction of liberty (from 1 month to 2 
years) or in the aggravated type is punishable, apart from a fine (from 10 to 540 
day-fine units) or restriction of liberty (from 1 month to 2 years) also provides 
for a custodial sentence (from 1 month to 2 years) also by custodial sentence 
(from one month to one year). It is possible to discontinue conditionally the 
criminal proceedings (Article 66 PC) as well as to refrain from imposing the 
penalty (Article 59 PC). If a custodial sentence is imposed, its execution may be 
conditionally suspended for a probation period (Article 69 PC). In the event of 
an insult, the court may impose vindictive damages (up to PLN 100,000, unless 
otherwise provided by law – Article 48 PC) to be paid to the victim, the Polish 
Red Cross or for any other social purpose indicated by the victim (Article 216 
§ 4 PC). It is possible to rule that the judgment be made public, impose the 
obligation to rectify the damage and sometimes impose the forfeiture (e.g. 
forfeiture of the press material in which the insult was committed – Article 37a 
of the Press Law). 
As regards the number of adults who have been finally convicted (under 
private indictment) for offences defined in Article 216 of the Polish Penal 
Code, according to data submitted by the Ministry of Justice [23], in 2017 the 
figure amounted to 390 (a total of 360 under Article 216 § 1 PC, including 247 
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men and 113 women, and a total of 30 under Article 216 § 2 PC, including 22 
men and 8 women). The penalty of fine was most frequent: 291 convictions - 
74.6% (270 under Article 216 § 1 PC, and 21 under Article 216 § 2 PC); in 
second place was the penalty of restriction of liberty – 97 cases - 24.9% 
(88 under Article 216 § 1 PC and 9 under Article 216 § 2 PC). In one case, an 
immediate custodial sentence was imposed, and in one case a penal measure 
was imposed as an independent measure. In view of the above, it may be 
concluded that the courts are not too severe towards the perpetrators of insults, 
which seems to be reasonable, considering the degree of social harmfulness of 
these offences. 
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PARDON IN THE POLISH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - 
ANALYSIS OF THE INSTITUTION 
The discussed topic in this paper is the institution of pardon understood as 
an act of the executive power’s interference in the justice system. The Author 
pays special attention to criminal law and procedural regulations of this 
institution, trying to present the essence and character of the act of pardon. 
A pardon is a constitutionally permissible interference of the President in 
the area of jurisdiction exercised by independent and autonomous courts of law. 
The issue of the act of pardon is regulated by the Constitution of the Republic 
of Poland of 1997 and the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1997 (hereinafter: 
CCP). It should be emphasized that the act of pardon does not change the 
sentence and does not question the guilt of the convicted person. Therefore, it 
does not interfere with the material layer of the final verdict [1, p. 6]. The right 
of pardon may be exercised only when the ordinary measures envisaged by the 
law are no longer sufficient and considerations of justice and humanity demand 
an alteration of the legal situation of the convicted person [2]. 
As the Constitutional Court noted in its decision of 21 February 2007 (Ts 
47/06, LEX No 277465) "…the object of the procedure for pardon is the 
possibility of showing a special act of clemency to the convicted person, i.e. a 
person whose criminal responsibility has already been determined by a final 
court judgment. However, since the reason for the pardon cannot be any 
circumstance concerning the crime committed or contesting the determination 
of criminal responsibility, thus the convicted person no longer benefits from the 
right of defence“. The Code od Criminal Procedure regulates the pardon in 
Section XII devoted to proceedings after the judgment becomes final. 
